6._ Two visions

In this human level, that characterizes by the appearance of the self-conscience and the symbolic thought, it is logical to hope that conscience is taken --as we have done-- of the creative process, with its levels of emergence, and therefore of the presence and immanent activity of the spirit of God.

Nevertheless, we must admit that we have postulated the existence of God, like emergent definitive and final, only as a reasonable hypothesis. From here we have deduced the universal capacity to evolve towards God, the "spirit of God". Clear that a rigorous and skeptical thought does not have necessarily to accept this hypothesis.

In the first place, it can reject the concept of levels of emergence as ontologic realities. From a reductionist point of view, it can describe as real only the level most basic discernible, and as "mere epiphenomenons" the superior levels, that are thus limited to an "epistemologic" reality.

Then, even admitting the emergence process, it can think that its development does not progress towards a superior stage, but that runs erratically, randomly, or cyclicaly. It does not have why to accept an immanent tendency that defeats the hazard to control or to govern the process, giving it a trascendent purpose.

On the other hand, as all creative development implies a net cost of useful energy, that appears to be non-recoverable, and the total energy available would be finite, it thinks that an indefinite progress is impossible, that it will be arrived finally at the exhaustion, the "thermal death" or the dissolution of the universe in the nothing.

Of course, the present human knowledge is incomplete, and all their hypotheses and conclusions are debatable and provisional. However, it is a main and unrenounceable function of the thought doing these scientific hypotheses leaning in the reasoning and the experience, and not exclusively in intuitions or supposed illuminations.
We have already affirmed that the superior levels of emergency are completely unknowables for the reason and the experience, except, perhaps, as doubtful extrapolations. Therefore, it turns out to be at least admissible to deny all intrinsic purpose to the process of changes in Nature.

We recognize therefore an attitude which we call "of going", that sees (provisionally) in the power of change of the Nature, a limited characteristic, dominated by physical and statistical laws, devoid of purpose, or that admits a later purpose only like hypothesis not-scientist, more or less reasonable.

Nevertheless, we accept the other attitude, that we call "of return", that is the described one previously: the one that believes in a Last Newness, in a trascendent final emergent state --in God-- like purpose of the process of cosmic creation, and interprets the creative capacity of the Nature as the immanent spirit of God.
In addition, we maintain that both attitudes, although apparently opposed and irreconcilables, are assumibles, advisable, and mutually enriching, although never must mix, because this gives rise to lamentable errors and conflicts.